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Abstract—Many machine learning adversarial attacks find adversarial samples of a victim model M by following the gradient of some
attack objective functions, either explicitly or implicitly. To confuse and detect such attacks, we take the proactive approach that modifies
those functions with the goal of misleading the attacks to some local minimals, or to some designated regions that can be easily picked
up by an analyzer. To achieve this goal, we propose adding a large number of artifacts, which we called attractors, onto the otherwise
smooth function. An attractor is a point in the input space, where samples in its neighborhood have gradient pointing toward it. We
observe that decoders of watermarking schemes exhibit properties of attractors and give a generic method that injects attractors from a
watermark decoder into the victim model M. This principled approach allows us to leverage on known watermarking schemes for
scalability and robustness and provides explainability of the outcomes. Experimental studies show that our method has competitive
performance. For instance, for un-targeted attacks on CIFAR-10 dataset, we can reduce the overall attack success rate of DeepFool [1] to
1.9%, whereas known defense LID [2], FS [3] and MagNet [4] can reduce the rate to 90.8%, 98.5% and 78.5% respectively.
Index Terms—Computer Security, Machine Learning.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MACHINE learning models such as deep neural networksare vulnerable towards adversarial attacks [5] where a
small carefully crafted perturbation on the input could lead to a
wrong prediction result. As machine learning gains popularity, such
vulnerability has brought forward concerns of machine learning
adoptions in environments subjected to adversarial influences,
such as biometric authentication, fraud detection and autonomous
driving.
There are extensive studies on the defenses of neural network
models. Many proposed methods, in order to detect and recover
from adversarial perturbations, make decision based on character-
istics of the perturbed adversarial samples. Such characteristics
could be implicitly learnt, e.g. through adversarial training [6]
and secondary classification [7], [8], [9], or explicitly determined
such as transformation methods [10], [11], [12], [13] and principal
component analysis (PCA) based methods [14], [15].
In this paper, we take a different approach. Instead of focusing
on the characteristics of adversarial samples, we consider character-
istics of the attacking process. We view an attack as an optimization
process with respect to some attack objective functions, and our
goal is to proactively modify such objective functions so as to
confuse and mislead the attacker.
We propose explicitly injecting attractors to the classifier. An
attractor is a sample that influences the attack objective function, so
that gradients of the attack objective function in its neighborhood
are pointing toward the attractor. The attractors serve two purposes.
Firstly, they are “potholes” and “bumps” injected into the otherwise
smooth slope, so as to confuse the search process. Secondly, they
can trick the search process to some designated regions which
make adversarial samples easily detected by an analyzer or even
recovered to give correct prediction results.
(a) Original victim model (b) Model with attractors
Fig. 1: Illustration of attractor. The function of soft label for the
class red is shown as a surface. The classifier’s decision boundary
(soft label crossing the threshold) is shown on the projected plane.
Figure 1 illustrates attractors on a two-class example. A sample
is classified as class red if its soft label exceeds certain threshold.
The function of the soft label for class red is shown as a surface in
the figure. Figure 1(a) depicts the original victim classifier whereas
Figure 1(b) depicts the situation after attractors are injected. There
are two types of attractors: potholes and bumps. Let us consider
an attack that follows the gradient so as to minimally perturb a
given sample from class red to class blue. Due to the existence
of attractors, this causes the perturbation to move toward a pothole.
Similarly, for a sample in class blue, a perturbation that follows
opposite direction of the gradient will end up in a bump. Samples
near potholes and bumps are designated and declared as adversarial
samples during analysis. With the attractors, attacker would be
confused and either being trapped in some nearby local minimals,
or to the designated regions.
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2Different attacks optimize different objective functions. As
many attacks either directly or indirectly optimize the soft label,
a natural candidate of attack objective function is the soft label.
We also consider the “local density function” as a candidate which
we believe is more generic as it is determined by the classifier’s
decision boundary.
We propose a construction that injects attractors by adding a
flat surface scattered with potholes and bumps onto the classifier’s
soft labels. Let Cψ : X → Rn be the model we want to protect,
where n is the number of classes and ψ represents the model
parameters. We first choose a robust digital watermarking scheme
and its decoderWφ : X → Rn, which is coded as a neural network
model parameterized by φ, and the i-th coefficient of Wφ(x) is
the correlation value of x with the i-th watermark message. One
can visualize that the surfaces ofWφ(x) is flat but scattered with
attractors, since there are watermarked samples everywhere by
the fidelity requirement on watermarking schemes. To inject these
attractors into the model Cψ , we simply combine Cψ andWφ to
form a new model M(ψ,φ) that outputs the normalized sum of
both models’ outputs1. In other words, given an input x, the final
predicted soft labels visible to the adversaries yˆ is the normalized
(Cψ(x) +Wφ(x)) as illustrated in Figure 2.
M(ψ,φ)
Fig. 2: The output of the classifier Cψ and watermark decoderWφ
are stitched together to form the final output.
During analysis, when a sample in question is unusually close
to a particular attractor, we declare it as adversarial. To see why
the method is able to detect and recover, note that by adding
the k-th soft label, say cˆk where k ∈ [1, . . . , n], to the k-th
watermark’s correlation value wˆk would “bind” the k-th class to
the k-th watermark message. Now, if a targeted attack attempts to
increase the prediction (cˆk + wˆk), it would unknowingly increase
the correlation to the corresponding wˆk. Likewise, if a un-targeted
attack attempts to decrease the prediction (cˆk+wˆk), the correlation
of wˆk would be decreased.
Beside conceptually simple, the proposed approach has a few
additional advantages. The approach is generic and can incorporate
different watermarking schemes, and thus can leverage on extensive
known works in digital watermarking. For instance, one could
employ high capacity watermarking schemes to protect models
with large number of classes. Furthermore, when deployed in
the black-box setting, no re-training of Cψ is required. More
1. It is tempting to adopt some non-linear combination, such as a weighted
sum where the weight varies with the watermark’s strength. Interestingly,
formulation of attractor suggests that such type of weighted sum is a poor
choice. In fact, this weighted sum variant is the counter-example we constructed
to show the difference between attractor and trapdoor, a known formulation.
importantly, the modular approach provides insights into the
internal mechanism and provides explainability of the outcomes.
A combined modelM(ψ,φ) obtained by simply stitching Cψ and
Wφ together is vulnerable to a white-box attack which directly
unstitches and obtains Cψ . To prevent such attacks, we can apply
neural network obfuscation or distillation techniques [16], [17],
[18], [19], [20], [21] that transfer the stitched model to the final
classifier. In this paper, we propose a method that obfuscates a
spread spectrum watermark decoder and a classifier together to
demonstrate feasibility of the proposed approach.
Although different in motivation, our method is closely related
to trapdoors [22] which are global perturbations that lead to
misclassification. Similar idea was also explored in [23] and [24].
We give a detailed comparison between our approach and trapdoor
in Section 7.
We conducted experiments against 18 known attacks and
compareds our results with some known detection defenses. The
results show that our performance is very competitive (results
reported in Table 3). For example, for un-targeted attack on CIFAR-
10 dataset, we can reduce the attack success rate of DeepFool [1] to
1.9%, while known defense LID [2], FS [3], and MagNet [4] can
reduce the rate to 90.8%, 98.5% and 78.5% respectively under the
setting where the attack does not utilize the analyzers’ outcomes.
When the attack utilizes the analyzers’ outcomes, our method can
reduce to 3.3%.
Nonetheless, the approach of influencing attacking process is
arguably vulnerable to transfer attacks. Fortunately, known defenses
can be combined with attractors. We use an enhanced model to
illustrate the combined effectiveness.
Our evaluations are conducted on known attacks. While we are
not aware of specific attacks on our method, a potential weakness
could be the way various components are stitched/obfuscated
together. It would be interesting to further investigate attack and
defenses on the stitching method.
Contributions:
1) We give a formulation of attractors and highlight its roles in
defending adversarial attacks. We point out crucial difference
between this formulation and existing notions.
2) We propose a generic approach that takes a watermarking
decoder and combines it with the victim model.
3) We give an obfuscation technique that combines a classifier
with spread spectrum watermark decoder.
4) Through extensive experiments against a wide range of attacks
and comparison with state-of-art approaches, we demonstrate
that the proposed defense attains competitive performance.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
2.1 Attacks
The goal of adversarial attack is to find a small distortion on
the sample that leads to the wrong prediction results, and can
be formulated as an optimization problem. To the best of our
knowledge, all known efficient attacks utilize some kind of
objective functions to guide the searches of adversary samples.
Here we categorize them into backpropagation-based attacks2 and
non-backpropagation2 based attacks.
2. In the literature, they are also knowns as gradient-based and non-gradient
based attacks respectively. In our paper, we do not use the term “gradient”
to address their differences as it may be confusing in this context. Non-
backpropagation based attacks can also look for gradients of some functions,
even when the soft label is unknown or not differentiable.
32.1.1 Backpropagation-based Attacks
Many attacks make use of the concept of backpropagation. During
normal training, a loss between the expected correct output and
actual output is computed and backpropagated through the network
to compute the gradient of each parameter and then update them
accordingly. During attack, adversary fixes parameters but uses an
attack objective function to compute a loss and backpropagates
it to update the input. Based on the attack objective function,
backpropagation-based attacks can be divided into following
categories:
Derived from Training Loss Function. The attack objective
function can be derived from the training loss function directly.
Such attack objective functions only consider the actual output and
adversary’s desired output. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6]
is a simple and fast approach. The input is perturbed using the
direction of backpropagated gradients with a fixed scale . There
are many variations of FGSM which incorporate improvements
such as iterative process [25], [26] and momentum [27].
Optimization with Less Distortion. There are also attack
objective functions [1], [5], [28], [29] that do not only compare
outputs but also take the amount of perturbation into consideration.
The adversary can either add the loss derived from training loss
function and amount of perturbation together to optimize them as
a whole, or turn the process into a constrained search algorithm
which aims to change the prediction result with minimum possible
perturbation. Attacks using this type of objective functions are
often able to find adversarial samples with smaller perturbation
while making some tradeoff in speed of generation.
Optimization with Special Goals. There are also other
attacks using concept of backpropagation but with special
attack objective functions. Universal Adversarial Perturbations
(UAP) [30] creates image agnostic perturbation that can cause
misclassification for most images in a distribution instead of just
one image. Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [31]
selects only a few pixels in a clean sample and saturates them to
cause misclassification.
2.1.2 Non-backpropagation Based Attacks
There are attacks which do not rely on backpropagation and
use different attack objective functions. Nevertheless, they still
can define attack objective functions and use some form of
optimization techniques. Such attacks can work in both black-box
and white-box settings. Based on their mechanisms, they can be
divided into following categories:
Score-based Attacks. Score-based attacks utilize the soft
labels or probability scores provided by the model. Adversary can
still compute a loss based on the actual output and desired output.
Without backpropagation, non-gradient optimization methods [32],
[33], [34] can be used to optimize this objective function.
Decision-based Attacks. When the adversary only has access
to the prediction decision without the score, designing an attack
becomes more difficult. Boundary attack [35] and attack on
attention [36] belong to this category.
Approximation of Gradient. There are also scenarios that
adversary has full access to the model but cannot get useful
gradients due to the existence of some level of defense. Backward
Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) [37] and Simultaneous
Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) [38] are designed
to approximate gradients for non-differentiable layers to bypass
such defenses.
2.1.3 Transfer-based Attacks
Adversarial attacks are shown to be transferable in certain way.
Papernot et al. show that adversarial samples found using a
substitute model [39] could also be adversarial to the original
victim model. Adversary can therefore run model extraction [40]
on a black-box victim model, apply known white-box attacks
(either backpropagation-based or non-backpropagation based) on
extracted model and then transfer adversarial samples to the original
black-box model.
2.1.4 Attacks Used in Our Experiments
Adversarial machine learning is an active field. We try to cover as
many attacks as possible in our experiments. We list all attacks
we used for experiments in Appendix A. We refer to Carlini et
al.’s guideline [41], [42] and consider combinations of different
settings.
2.2 Defenses
Many defenses have been proposed to enhance classification
robustness based on some difference between the characteristics of
clean and adversarial samples.
Characteristics of adversarial samples could be implicitly learnt
and used, for example, through adversarial training [6] in which
the victim model is trained on adversarial examples and learns to
correct them. They could also be analyzed and identified explicitly.
For example, transformation methods [10], [11], [12], [13] was
proposed based on the characteristic that adversarial samples are not
robust against adding noise. Principal component analysis (PCA)
based methods [14], [15] is able to recover the correct label by
using the characteristic that adversarial perturbation affects mostly
the lower-order PCA components.
In our experiments, we compare our proposed method with
adversarial training as well as three approaches that explicitly
use adversarial characteristics to directly generate a yes or no
answer regarding any given input: Local Intrinsic Dimensionality
Based Detector (LID) [2], Feature Squeezing Detector (FS) [3]
and MagNet Detector [4]. We describe these three approaches in
Appendix B.
2.2.1 Trapdoor
Shan et al.’s approach [22] of using an active method to capture
adversarial attacks is related to our idea but with a different
motivation. Given a classification model Mθ, they define the
notion of “trapdoor” ∆t and a “trapdoored” modelMθ′ such that
Pr(arg max(Mθ′(x + ∆t)) = t) ≥ 1 − µ where µ is a small
constant.
The “trapdoored” model Mθ′ is obtained through training.
The original training dataset is augmented with trapdoor embedded
samples. For any x in the training dataset, the label of their trapdoor
embedded version x+ ∆t is set to t. The goal of the training is to
minimize the classification loss and make the trained model reach
an optimal such that it can classify both clean samples and trapdoor
embedded samples. As adversarial generation functions naturally
gravitate toward these trapdoors, they will produce adversarial
4samples that the model owner can recognize through a known
neuron activation signature. More details will be discussed in
Section 7.
3 THREAT MODEL
An attacker, given an input x and access to the victim classifierMθ ,
wants to find a small perturbation  such that x+  is misclassified
byMθ .
3.1 Analyzer
An analyzer runs analysis on a given input sample to decide whether
it is subjected to adversarial attacks.
A Detection analyzer is a probabilistic function Fd : X →
{yes, no}. When given an input x, Fd decides whether x has been
subjected to attack, and outputs yes iff it deems so. A Recovery
analyzer Fr : X → Y takes a step further. On input an adversarial
sample x, it outputs a prediction closest to the original prediction
prior to the attack.
A defend mechanism could have an explicit analyzer in its
workflow, that is, the mechanism first applies classification, and
then the analyzer to get the final predication. The workflow of
classify-detect-then-recover can be combined as a single model.
On the other hand, some mechanisms do not follow the above
mentioned workflow. For example. a model hardened via adversar-
ial training would directly produce the predication from the input.
Nonetheless, there is still an implicit analyzer that is hidden in the
inference process.
3.2 Settings of Attacks
We consider two attack settings, which differ on whether the
attacks utilize analyzers outcomes.
Setting 1. The attacker has white-box or black-box access
to the victim model Mθ. An attack, e.g. FGSM, would be
conducted on the modelMθ to obtain the adversarial sample. This
is also known as “non-adaptive” attack by Carlini et al. [41].
Setting 2. The attacker has access to the outcomes of the
analyzers, that is, the combined classify-detect-then-recover model
described in section 3.1. Hence, an attack such as FGSM will be
conducted on the parameters of the combined model.
Evaluation of many detection-based defenses are conducted
under Setting 1, where the attacks do not utilize outcomes from
the analyzers. For instance, LID, FS, MagNet and Trapdoor are
evaluated in this setting.
3.3 Targeted/Un-targeted
When given a clean input x, the attacker may have a specific
goal of finding a sample that is being misclassified to a particular
given class. Such goal is known as targeted attack. Alternatively,
the attacker could be contended with a weaker goal that finds a
sample that is being misclassified to any class. This is known as
un-targeted attack. To an adversary, un-targeted attack is easier to
achieve since the adversarial sample just has to be misclassified to
any class.
4 ATTRACTORS
4.1 Motivation
Most attacks search for adversarial samples along directions derived
from some local properties. For instance, FGSM takes training loss
function’s gradient as the search direction. Our goal is to confuse
the adversary by adding artifacts to taint those local properties, so
as to lead the search process to some local minimals, or to some
designated regions that aid detection. In a certain sense, the artifacts
are potholes and bumps added to an otherwise smooth slope.
This motivates the definition of attractors. Intuitively, each
attractor x0 is a sample in the input space, such that the search
process would eventually lead all samples in its neighborhood to
x0. Hence, if the input space is scattered with attractors, then the
search process would be confused. In our formulation, we call
information utilized by the attack as an attack objective function,
and require its gradients pointing toward the attractors.
Our formulation is inspired, but different from the attractor in
dynamical systems [43].
4.2 Definition of Attractors
Consider a classification modelMθ : X → Y parameterized by θ,
and let L : X → R be an attack objective function.
Definition. We say that a point x0 ∈ X is a µ-attractor in Mθ
with respect to the attack objective function L(·, ·, ·) on yt if there
exists a neighborhood of x0, called the basin of x0 and denoted as
B(x0), such that for all x ∈ B(x0),
cos(∇xL(θ,x,yt),x0 − x) ≥ 1− µ
where cos(·, ·) is the cosine similarity function cos(a,b) =
a·b
‖a‖‖b‖ and yt is the one-hot vector of the t-th class.
4.3 Choice of Attack Loss Function
Note that the definition of attractor depends on the attack objective
functions. Here are two candidates.
1) Soft Label. Given a model Mθ, let us choose the attack
objective function same as the training loss function, that is
L(θ,x,yt) = J(θ,x,yt). Note that ∇xJ(θ,x,yt) is the
gradient of the t-th soft label of Mθ(·) at x. This choice of
objective function makes sense as many attacks such as FGSM
find the adversarial sample by moving along the direction
∇xJ(θ,x,yt). In un-targeted attack with the goal of moving
away from class t, the attack moves along the direction
∇xJ(θ,x,yt). Whereas in targeted attack with the goal of
finding a misclassification to class t, the attack moves along the
direction −∇xJ(θ,x,yt).
2) Local Density. For a modelMθ and a sample x, let us define
(t, δ)-local density, denoted Hδ(θ,x,yt), as the proportion of
samples within the sphere of radius δ centered at x that are
classified as the t-th class. That is,
Hδ(θ,x,yt) = |{x˜ ∈ Sδ(x)| arg max(Mθ(x˜)) = t}||Sδ(x)|
where Sδ(x) is the sphere of radius δ centered at x. If x belongs
to the class t, we would expect the local density Ht,δ(x) to
be large. Local density, as a choice of objective function for
attractors, is more relevant to adversarial attacks that make
decision based on the predicated class instead of the numeric
predication score.
5To protect against different attacks, we look for a model that
possesses attractors with respect to a wide range of attack objective
functions. In addition, if a model contains attractors w.r.t. the attack
objective function L, the model should also contain attractors w.r.t.
−L. This is to cater for both targeted attacks and un-targeted
attacks which optimize in the opposite directions.
5 PROPOSED METHOD: ATTRACTORS FROM WA-
TERMARKING
5.1 Main Idea
Our construction makes use of a known modelWφ that exhibits
properties of attractors. To protect a victim classifier Cψ , we “inject”
attractors from Wφ into Cψ , giving a new model M(ψ,φ). The
new modelM(ψ,φ) binds each training class of Cψ to a class of
attractors inWφ, and the binding is achieved by simply giving the
normalized sum of Cψ(x) +Wφ(x) on input x.
We choose a watermarking scheme and take its decoder asWφ.
Under a watermarking scheme with capacity of n messages, each
sample in the domain can be decoded to one of the n messages.
The goal of the decoder, similar to a classifier, is to determine the
message embedded in the sample x. In this paper, we treat the
decoder as a functionWφ : X → Rn, where a coefficient of the
output is the correlation value (or confidence level) of the input
with a message. Hence the decoded message is the i-th message,
where i = arg maxWφ(x). By treating the decoder Wφ as a
function, the notion of attractors can be applied.
By summing Wφ with Cψ as described in the previous
paragraph, the i-th training class of Cψ is being bound to
the i-th watermark message. Hence if an adversarial intend to
maximize/minimize the i-th coefficient of the sum (Cψ(·)+Wφ(·)),
it would unknowingly maximize/minimize the correlation with the
i-th watermarking message.
5.2 ClassifierM(ψ,φ)
Figure 2 illustrates our construction. Given the original classifier
Cψ and the choice of watermark decoder Wφ, on input x, the
classifierM(ψ,φ) outputs the normalized sum, i.e.
M(ψ,φ)(x) = Cψ(x) +Wφ(x)|Cψ(x) +Wφ(x)| (1)
In our experimentation, we choose spread spectrum [44] and Quan-
tization Index Modulation (QIM) [45] as the digital watermarking
scheme. Section 5.4 gives details of our implementation.
5.3 Analyzer
Detection Analyzer. The detection analyzerFd : X → {yes, no}
decides whether an input sample is adversarial. In our proposed
method, on input x, Fd makes decision based on the values of wˆ =
Wφ(x), and some predefined thresholds U,L, σ0. The detection
analyzer declares x as adversarial iff any of the following three
conditions holds:
C1 : max(wˆ) > U ; C2 : min(wˆ) < L; C3 : stdev(wˆ) > σ0
where the vector wˆ is treated as a sequence of real values, and
stdev(·) is the standard deviation over these real values. The
predefined thresholds are determined by conducting statistical tests
on clean and adversarial data. The above conditions essentially
determine whether the coefficients in wˆ are anomalies. Unusually
high correlation (condition C1) indicates targeted attack. Unusually
low correlation (condition C2) indicates un-targeted attack. Large
variation (condition C3) indicates optimization and searching has
being conducted on the sum.
Recovery Analyzer. The recovery analyzer Fr : X → Y
is only invoked on input x that is declared as adversarial by the
detection analyzer. On an input x that is declared as un-targeted
attack by the detection analyzer, the recovery analyzer returns
arg minWφ(x). For input that is declared as targeted attack, it
returns arg max Cψ(x).
To see that why we choose the above logic, note that if the
victim x is from i-th class, during an un-targeted attack, the attacker
attempts to reduce the i-th coefficient of the normalized sum in
equation (1), and would unknowingly suppress the i-th coefficient
ofWφ(x). Therefore, the smallest coefficient is likely the original
class.
During a targeted attack to j-th class where j 6= i, the attacker
attempts to maximally increase the j-th coefficient with some fixed
perturbation. It would be harder to recover the original class from
Wφ(x). Therefore, we can use arg max Cψ(x) to recover the
correct class as Cψ(x) is likely unaffected. In fact, our analysis in
Section 6.3 shows that due to the confusing effect of attractor, the
value change caused by adversarial perturbation is mostly reflected
in the output ofWφ(x) while Cψ(x) is not affected much.
In our proposed analyzers, the outcomes are decided based on
explainable logic. It is also possible to construct an analyzer by
training a classier that distinguishes adversarial samples using the
output of Cψ(x) andWφ(x).
5.4 Watermark Decoder
Spread Spectrum Decoder. Let us describe spread spectrum
watermarking in the context of image data. Given a `-pixel image
x = (x1, x2, . . . , x`) and a particular `-bit watermark message
m = m1m2 . . .m`, spread spectrum decoder defines the distance
between x and m as:
D(x,m) =
∑`
i=1
αi · (xi −mi)2
where αi are some predefined weights. The distance (which is
low for image containing the message) is to be mapped to the
correlation value (which is high for image containing the message)
by a decreasing function S : R→ R, so that the distances are in the
range [0, 1]. Overall, on input x, Wφ outputs 〈wˆ1, wˆ2, . . . , wˆn〉,
where
wˆi = S(D(x,mi))
for each i, where 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 are n pre-selected `-bit messages
that are embedded/hardcoded intoWφ.
We can easily implement the decoder in the form of neural
networks.
QIM Decoder. We can also adopt a basic variant of Quantization
Index Modulation (QIM) watermarking scheme [45] for Wφ.
In the context of image data, the distance of `-pixel image
x = (x1, x2, . . . , x`) and a particular `-bit watermark message
m = m1m2 . . .m` is determined in the following way: The value
of the i-th pixel is quantized with a predefined step size δi. The
codewords for 0 are at 0.5δi, 2.5δi, . . . and the codewords for 1
are at 1.5δi, 3.5δi, . . .. The distance of the i-th pixel to mi is its
6distance to the nearest codeword for mi as illustrate in Figure 3.
Let us denote the distance as q(xi,mi, δi).
0 64 128 192 256
0 1 0 1
Fig. 3: An example of quantization on pixel (with step size of 64).
The black dots are the pixel values, and the message is 1.
We take the weighted sum of distances over all the pixels as
the distance between x and m, that is,
Q(x,m) =
∑`
i=1
αi · q(xi,mi, δi)
where αi are some predefined weights. Similar to spread spectrum
decoder, we map distances to correlation values. On input x,Wφ
outputs 〈wˆ1, wˆ2, . . . , wˆn〉, where
wˆi = S(Q(x,mi))
for each i, where 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 are n pre-selected `-bit messages
that are embedded/hardcoded intoWφ.
Remarks. There are a few advantages of using a watermarking
decoder: (1) By fidelity requirement of watermarking scheme, the
watermarked samples/attractors are scattered over X and thus for
any point in X , there is a nearby watermarked sample/attractor. (2)
There is an efficient decoder to detect watermarked sample/attractor.
(3) There are extensive studies on watermarking in the past two
decades, which we can leverage on for construction and analysis
of attractors.
5.5 Obfuscation
Given two models Cψ andWφ, we want to find a modelM that
outputs Cψ(x) +Wφ(x) on input x, such that from the layout
of M, it is difficult to obtain Cψ and Wφ. That is, we want to
obfuscate the stitched model. In our experiment, we apply the
method to spread spectrum decoder.
Model Architecture. We first select a base neural network
structure where the last layer does not have activation function
and the last layer contains n + 1 nodes, where n is the number
of classes. Let us denote this structure as C = (S,L0) where L0
represents the last layer, including its weights, and S consists of
all the layers before the last. We construct anotherW = (S,L1)
where the parameters of S in C and W are shared and L1 has
same shape as L0.
Training Procedure. We adopt alternate training here: we
train C to classify the training dataset D and we trainW to classify
watermarks. To be specific, when a sample x ∈ D is fed into C, it
should be classified correctly into one of the classes from 0 to n.
When a watermark is fed into C, it will be classified as the n+ 1th
class. Vice versa, when a watermark is fed into W , it should be
classified with the correct watermark ID from 0 to n. When a
sample x ∈ D is fed intoW , it will be classified as the n+1th class.
Conversion for Inference. When the alternate training is
completed, both C andW attain high accuracy. We convert them
to a final modelM = (S,L2) where L2 is obtained by summing
the corresponding weights in L0 and L1 and removing the n+ 1th
node.
After these operations, an attacker will neither be able to
simply differentiate this obfuscated model from another ordinary
model nor able to undo the obfuscation. At the same time, this
model outputs the soft label which is the sum of the classification
result and watermark score, thus achieves the effect of attractors.
Remarks. Note the notion of obfuscation here is different
from gradient obfuscation methods investigated by Athalye
et al. [37]. A gradient obfuscation method creates a non-
backpropagatable function so that adversaries are unable to
obtain the gradient signal. In contrast, gradients of attractors
are still smooth and differentiable almost everywhere even after
obfuscation, and thus are backpropagatable. In fact, our intention
is to feed gradient information to the attackers so as to pull them
nearer to an attractor.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we benchmark our method against some well-known
adversarial attacks and compare the results with state-of-art defense.
Ling et al. released DEEPSEC [46] which is a platform for security
analysis of deep learning models. We conduct our experiment using
this platform for comparison.
6.1 Dataset
We tested our approach using two datasets: MNIST and CIFAR-
10. MNIST contains 60,000 training images and 10,000 testing
images. CIFAR-10 contains 50,000 training images and 10,000
testing images. Both of these two datasets have 10 classes. MNIST
samples are greyscale images with size of 28× 28× 1 and CIFAR-
10 samples are colored images with size of 32× 32× 3.
6.2 Model Setup
We constructed three models for our evaluations:
• M(ψ,φ): The classifier stitched together with a QIM decoder
mentioned in Section 5.4.
• M˜: The obfuscated classifier with spread spectrum decoder
embedded inside described in Section 5.5.
• M˜COMB : An combination of obfuscated classifier M˜ and
another defense (e.g. adversarial training).
We constructed these models for both MNIST and CIFAR-10
dataset. For MNIST dataset, we used a standard CNN as base model.
For CIFAR-10, we used ResNet-20 as base model. These models
are same as the raw models used in the DEEPSEC. ForM(ψ,φ)
which does not require retraining, its weight is also obtained from
DEEPSEC3. For the QIM quantization in Wφ, we represent the
pixel as values from [0,255] and use two interval sizes: 3 and
128. The QIM setting is the same in experiments on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 dataset.
6.3 Attractors’ Influences
Firstly, without looking at any adversarial sample, we are interested
in knowing (1) how do attractors affect accuracy and (2) whether
attractors indeed confuse the objective function and lead them to
designated regions. We have designed some experiments to do the
analysis. These experiments were conducted using modelM(ψ,φ).
3. https://github.com/kleincup/DEEPSEC
7Strength of Victim Model vs Attractors. This experiment
compares the “strength” of victim model against the watermark
decoder on clean input, so as to verify that they can meet the
requirements on classification accuracy and attractors.
We first feed 10,000 testing images from MNIST dataset into
both the victim model Cψ and the watermark decoderWφ. Next,
for each testing image, we measure the magnitudes (w.r.t. 1-norm)
of the output, and magnitudes of the gradients. In other words,
we are comparing the signal at (1) and (2) in Figure 2. Kernel
Density Estimate (KDE) derived from the measurements are shown
in Figure 4.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4: Comparing magnitude (1-norm) of outputs and gradients
from Cψ andWφ. (a) KDE plot of ‖H1‖1 and ‖H2‖1 whereH1 =
Wφ(x) and H2 = Cψ(x). (b) KDE plot of ‖T1‖1 and ‖T2‖1
where T1 = ∇xJ(φ,x,ytrue) and T2 = ∇xJ(ψ,x,ytrue).
Figure 4(a) shows that the magnitude of the output from the
original Cψ is much larger than the magnitude of the output from
the decoder Wφ. In other words, in Figure 2, the signal at (1)
dominates (2), and thus the attractors have small impact on the
classification accuracy on clean input.
On the other hand, from Figure 4(b), we can see that the
gradient’s magnitude from Wφ is much larger than those from
the original model Cψ . Hence, during attack, the attacker’s
optimization strategy would mostly affected by the watermark
decoder instead of the original model.
Soft Label. This experiment verifies that the direction of
gradients fromM(ψ,φ) indeed exhibit properties of attractors. To
verify this property, for each testing image x, we find the nearest
attractor xw and its label t and determine the cosine similarity
between (xw − x) and the gradient −∇xJ((ψ, φ),x,yt) at x.
We also repeat the measurement on the original model Cψ , that
is, measuring the cosine similarity of (xw − x) and the gradient
−∇xJ(ψ,x,yt).
The experiment is conducted with 10,000 testing images in
MNIST. The KDE of the measurements are shown in Figure 5(a).
Note the clear separation between them. Furthermore, note that
for M(ψ,φ), cosine similarity is more than 0.8, inferring that
a randomly chosen clean sample is likely to have its gradient
pointing toward the nearest attractor. Thus we have empirically
verified that the basins of µ-attractors cover the sample space,
where µ < 0.2.
Local Density. We repeat the experiment described in Section 6.3
on local density function and plot the Kernel Density Estimate
(KDE) in Figure 5(b). For each testing image x, we find the nearest
attractor xw and its label t and determine the cosine similarity
between (xw − x) and the gradient ∇xHδ((ψ, φ),x,yt) at x.
We also repeat the measurement on the original model Cψ , that
is, measuring the cosine similarity of (xw − x) and the gradient
∇xHδ(ψ,x,yt).
The experiment is conducted with 10,000 testing images in
MNIST. The KDE of the measurements are shown in Figure 5(b).
The result shows that if we choose µ = 0.9, a randomly chosen
clean sample has more than 50% chance of being in the basin of a
µ-attractor.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: (a) KDE plot of cosine similarity between the direction
to the nearby attractor (xw − x) and the gradient for a randomly
chosen x. Z1 = cos((xw − x),−∇xJ(ψ,x,yt)) and Z2 =
cos((xw − x),−∇xJ((ψ, φ),x,yt)). (b) KDE plot of cosine
similarity between the direction to the nearby attractor (xw − x),
and the gradient of local density function for a randomly chosen
x. S1 = cos((xw − x),∇xHδ(ψ,x,yt)) and S2 = cos((xw −
x),∇xHδ((ψ, φ),x,yt)).
6.4 On Clean Data
We evaluated the performance of attractors on clean data (10,000
testing images) and reported in Table 1. In this experiment, we
use modelM(ψ,φ) and its analyzers Fd and Fr . As expected, the
classification accuracy of the proposed attractor-embedded model
is close to the original victim model Cψ .
MNIST CIFAR-10
Victim model Cψ 99.3% 90.1%
Attractors-embedded model M(ψ,φ) 98.9% 90.0%
Attractors-embedded model M(ψ,φ) + Fd4+ Fr 98.6% 89.6%
TABLE 1: Performance of the proposed modelM(ψ,φ) (for both
direct and recovered outputs), and the victim model Cψ on clean
samples.
6.5 Attack Setup
We used 18 attacks in total. 10 of them are un-targeted attacks, 8
of them are targeted attacks. Details of these attacks are included
in Appendix A.
The details of experiment settings are in Appendix E. We use
the settings in DEEPSEC [46]5 to compare our approach with
LID, FS and MagNet. The setup is summarized in Table 9. For
comparison with Trapdoor, we use the settings reported by Shan et
al. [22], which are summarized in Table 10.
4. The false positive rate of Fd is set to 0.5% here.
5. We are aware of the controversy [42] over DEEPSEC. The results in their
paper may give advantages to defender. We use latest version of corrected
attacks from GitHub. Among the defenses, we only quote results for detection-
only defenses in Setting 1.
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UA
/TA
(b) Attacks
MNIST CIFAR-10
Attack Success Rate (e)
Detection on
Misclassfied
Input
Fd
(f)
Recovery on
Detected
Input
Fr
(g)
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
Attack Success Rate (j)
Detection on
Misclassfied
Input
Fd
(k)
Recovery on
Detected
Input
Fr
(`)
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
(c)
Original
Classifier
Cψ
(d)
With
Attractor
M(ψ,φ)
(h)
Original
Classifier
Cψ
(i)
With
Attractor
M(ψ,φ)
UA
FGSM 80.8% 0.4% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 88.7% 53.5% 100.0% 99.8% 0.0%
RFGSM 74.2% 0.1% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.6% 62.7% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0%
BIM 100.0% 5.6% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 86.8% 99.9% 99.8% 0.1%
PGD 100.0% 6.9% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 94.6% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0%
UMIFGSM 100.0% 6.3% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 91.7% 98.1% 8.3%
UAP 39.5% 0.3% 66.7% 100.0% 0.1% 93.1% 87.0% 94.4% 10.9% 4.9%
DeepFool 100.0% 22.3% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 99.5% 98.1% 99.1% 1.9%
OM 100.0% 96.4% 87.8% 100.0% 11.8% 100.0% 100.0% 81.9% 93.8% 18.1%
BPDA 100.0% 7.6% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 92.1% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0%
SPSA 95.4% 21.1% 100.0% 93.7% 0.0% 90.2% 77.7% 100.0% 81.0% 0.0%
TA
LLC 7.5% 0.0%
No Adversarial Found
0.0% 13.2% 5.4% 98.1% 30.2% 0.1%
RLLC 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 27.6% 16.0% 100.0% 27.7% 0.0%
ILLC 67.1% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 93.7% 97.0% 55.7% 2.8%
TMIFGSM 84.9% 4.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 89.6% 22.7% 10.4%
JSMA 71.0% 5.3% 89.2% 93.1% 0.6% 100.0% 100.0% 92.9% 10.9% 7.1%
BLB 100.0% 6.2% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.8% 61.6% 0.2%
CW2 100.0% 12.9% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.7% 97.8% 0.3%
EAD 100.0% 4.5% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 77.5% 97.2% 95.4% 2.2%
TABLE 2: Performance of the undefended model and the proposed method against known attacks. Description in Section 6.6.1.
6.6 Evaluation in Attack Setting 1
We carried out each of the 18 attacks for both MNIST and CIFAR-
10 datasets on model M(ψ,φ). Here we are using the attacks in
Setting 1 as we described in Section 3.2. The attacks here are
pit against output ofM(ψ,φ) directly to cause wrong predictions,
without using the output of analyzers.
6.6.1 Performance of Proposed Method
The results are shown in Table 2. In our experiments, we look at
the attack success rate, detection rate, recovery rate and overall
attack success rate, which are described as follows6.
• Attack Success Rate measures the performance of a model
against attacks. We used the testing dataset and both undefended
and attractor-embedded models to generate adversarial samples.
For each image, if its adversarial sample generated from a model
indeed causes that model to make a wrong prediction, it is
counted as one success. The attack success rate is measured
differently for un-targeted, LLC and targeted attacks. For un-
targeted attacks, an attack is counted as successful if the
adversarial sample get misclassified into any class other than the
correct class. For LLC, an attack is successful if the adversarial
sample is misclassified into the least likely class. For targeted
attacks, an attack is successful if the adversarial sample is
misclassified into a randomly chosen intended target class. The
attack success rate on the undefended victim model Cψ , and the
attractor-embedded M(ψ,φ) are shown in Column (c) and (d)
respectively.
• Detection Rate evaluates detection analyzer Fd’s performance in
detecting adversarial behaviors on selected successful adversarial
samples. That is, suppose A is the set of adversarial samples
found by the attack (w.r.t.M(ψ,φ)), and B ⊆ A is the set of
adversarial samples that being detected by Fd, then the detection
rate is |B|/|A|. Detection rate is shown in Column (e).
• Recovery Rate evaluates recovery analyzer Fr’s performance
in recovering correct labels of adversarial samples successfully
6. We indicated whether the attack is targeted or un-targeted in Column (a)
and listed names of the attacks in Column (b). Column (h) to Column (l) repeats
the same evaluation as Column (c) to Column (g) on CIFAR-10 dataset.
detected by Fd. Specifically, let B be the set as defined in
previous paragraph, and C ⊆ B the set of adversarial samples
that Fr correctly recover the class, then the recovery rate is
|C|/|B|. Recovery rate is shown in Column (f).
• Overall Attack Success Rate is the percentage of successful
and undetected attacks among all attacks attempts. Specifically,
overall attack success rate = attack success rate ×( 1- detection
rate). Overall attack success rate is a fairer measurement
compared with detection rate. To see that, consider the case where
a model M(ψ,φ) is effective in confusing an attack and very
few adversarial samples are found by the attack, but the found
adversarial samples are the “difficult” samples to be detected
by the detector Fd. In this case, the detection rate is very low,
but overall, it is difficult for the attack to find undetectable
adversarial samples. In contrast, the overall attack success rate
is low in this case, and fairly reflects the effectiveness of this
attack against the defense methods. Overall attack success rate
is shown in Column (g).
From the results, we have made following observations:
OB1: Effectiveness of Confusing
Our experiments show that the successful rate on attractor-
embedded modelM(ψ,φ) is significantly lower when compared
with the undefended model Cψ . This observation is reflected in
Table 2 column (c), (d), (h) and (i). When adversary follows the
direction of gradient provided by the attractors, they move toward
the nearby attractor instead of the decision boundary, and thus may
be stuck in a local minimal or incur a larger perturbation, which
confuses the attacking process and leads to a lower attack success
rate.
OB2: Effectiveness on Non-backpropagation Attacks
We achieve high detection accuracy for most backpropagation-
based attacks. Note that non-backpropagation based attacks BPDA
and SPSA are also not effective against our defense. Although
BPDA is successful on defenses that break or hide the gradient, our
defense uses gradient to deceive the adversary instead of creating
non-backpropagatable functions, and therefore able to trick BPDA.
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UA
/TA Attacks
TPR
(a)
FPR
(b)
AUC
(c)
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate (d)
TPR FPR AUC
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
TPR FPR AUC
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
TPR FPR AUC
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
TPR FPR AUC
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
UA
FGSM 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 73.0% 3.6% 93.7% 8.2% 96.1% 4.9% 99.1% 1.2% 100.0% 6.6% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 5.0% 100% 0.0%
RFGSM 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 70.2% 4.1% 94.5% 10.2% 97.7% 3.5% 99.5% 0.8% 100.0% 3.5% 100.0% 0.0% - - - -
BIM 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 10.4% 4.2% 60.2% 67.7% 92.7% 3.7% 98.7% 5.5% 100.0% 3.7% 100.0% 0.0% - - - -
PGD 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 10.3% 4.1% 54.8% 73.9% 96.1% 3.4% 99.5% 3.2% 100.0% 3.6% 100.0% 0.0% - - - -
PGD* 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 100.0% 5.0% 100% 0.0%
UMIFGSM 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 22.7% 4.1% 67.6% 54.4% 90.5% 3.6% 98.4% 6.7% 100.0% 3.7% 100.0% 0.0% - - - -
UAP 66.7% 5.0% 83.3% 0.1% 87.8% 4.6% 97.5% 3.7% 99.7% 5.0% 99.6% 0.1% 100.0% 4.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - -
DeepFool 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 84.1% 2.9% 98.0% 15.9% 99.9% 4.0% 99.6% 0.1% 80.5% 3.6% 94.8% 19.5% - - - -
OM 87.8% 5.0% 92.9% 11.8% 60.7% 3.0% 90.0% 39.3% 94.0% 3.7% 99.1% 6.0% 91.3% 3.7% 97.0% 8.7% - - - -
BPDA 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 100.0% 5.0% 100% 0.0%
SPSA 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 100.0% 5.0% 100% 0.0%
TA
LLC
No Adversarial Found
0.0% 87.5% 3.6% 91.1% 0.7% 100.0% 7.1% 99.7% 0.0% 100.0% 1.8% 100.0% 0.0% - - - -
RLLC 0.0% 95.0% 5.0% 85.3% 0.2% 100.0% 2.5% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 2.5% 100.0% 0.0% - - - -
ILLC 0.0% 64.8% 5.9% 89.2% 20.9% 99.7% 3.9% 100.0% 0.2% 100.0% 5.2% 100.0% 0.0% - - - -
TMIFGSM 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 52.7% 3.5% 89.9% 40.9% 99.3% 3.0% 99.9% 0.6% 100.0% 4.5% 100.0% 0.0% - - - -
JSMA 89.2% 5.0% 92.8% 0.6% 69.1% 5.6% 92.8% 23.6% 100.0% 3.2% 99.6% 0.0% 84.0% 5.0% 95.3% 12.2% - - - -
BLB 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 77.5% 5.9% 94.7% 22.5% 99.7% 4.8% 99.5% 0.3% 98.2% 3.7% 99.1% 1.8% - - - -
CW2 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 93.9% 3.4% 99.2% 6.1% 100.0% 3.0% 99.6% 0.0% 80.5% 3.7% 94.5% 19.4% - - - -
CW2* 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 97.2% 5.0% 99% -
EAD 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 92.0% 3.5% 98.5% 8.0% 100.0% 3.5% 99.4% 0.0% 75.8% 4.4% 92.3% 24.2% - - - -
EAD* 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 98.0% 5.0% 99% -
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UA
/TA Attacks
TPR
(a)
FPR
(b)
AUC
(c)
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate (d)
TPR FPR AUC
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
TPR FPR AUC
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
TPR FPR AUC
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
TPR FPR AUC
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
UA
FGSM 100.0% 5.0% 99.9% 0.0% 100.0% 5.1% 100.0% 0.0% 9.5% 2.9% 82.6% 81.2% 99.1% 4.7% 93.5% 0.8% 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0%
RFGSM 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 2.9% 100.0% 0.0% 6.0% 4.8% 70.7% 78.7% 33.3% 3.2% 83.2% 55.8% - - - -
BIM 99.9% 5.0% 100.0% 0.1% 94.6% 2.9% 99.1% 5.4% 1.6% 4.5% 25.5% 98.4% 1.8% 4.2% 53.0% 98.2% - - - -
PGD 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9% 3.5% 100.0% 0.1% 0.4% 3.8% 16.5% 99.6% 3.2% 4.3% 59.2% 96.8% - - - -
PGD* 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0%
UMIFGSM 91.7% 5.0% 97.7% 8.3% 100.0% 3.0% 100.0% 0.0% 1.8% 4.1% 23.8% 98.2% 6.3% 4.1% 57.1% 93.7% - - - -
UAP 94.4% 5.0% 97.2% 4.9% 100.0% 5.3% 100.0% 0.0% 2.9% 3.8% 76.3% 82.8% 99.5% 5.9% 94.9% 0.4% - - - -
DeepFool 98.1% 5.0% 98.6% 1.9% 9.2% 5.7% 64.0% 90.8% 1.5% 3.9% 86.3% 98.5% 21.5% 2.8% 81.0% 78.5% - - - -
OM 81.9% 5.0% 88.3% 18.1% 8.8% 4.9% 65.1% 91.2% 25.0% 3.8% 89.0% 75.0% 46.4% 3.9% 78.7% 53.6% - - - -
BPDA 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0%
SPSA 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0%
TA
LLC 98.1% 5.0% 99.9% 0.1% 100.0% 1.5% 100.0% 0.0% 3.7% 9.0% 73.5% 12.9% 100.0% 6.7% 91.8% 0.0% - - - -
RLLC 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.0% 5.7% 99.2% 0.3% 11.7% 5.1% 71.0% 27.8% 31.4% 3.8% 81.2% 21.6% - - - -
ILLC 97.0% 5.0% 97.8% 2.8% 79.2% 5.3% 96.1% 20.8% 51.7% 3.3% 83.9% 48.3% 2.6% 4.7% 61.2% 97.4% - - - -
TMIFGSM 89.6% 5.0% 95.2% 10.4% 100.0% 5.8% 100.0% 0.0% 10.0% 3.8% 45.0% 90.0% 10.4% 3.8% 57.9% 89.6% - - - -
JSMA 92.9% 5.0% 97.2% 7.1% 71.5% 3.4% 94.4% 28.4% 20.6% 3.7% 91.7% 79.2% 53.2% 5.3% 92.3% 46.7% - - - -
BLB 99.8% 5.0% 99.9% 0.2% 13.0% 3.1% 72.3% 87.0% 1.7% 4.1% 89.3% 98.3% 52.5% 4.3% 81.6% 47.5% - - - -
CW2 99.7% 5.0% 99.8% 0.3% 19.9% 3.8% 77.6% 80.1% 0.9% 3.7% 88.1% 99.1% 38.4% 4.4% 81.8% 61.6% - - - -
CW2* 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 96.2% 5.0% 97.0% -
EAD 97.2% 5.0% 98.3% 2.2% 17.2% 4.0% 73.8% 82.8% 1.9% 3.5% 89.8% 98.1% 54.2% 5.0% 82.1% 45.8% - - - -
EAD* 100.0% 5.0% 100.0% 0.0% - - - - - - - - - - - - 95.0% 5.0% 97.0% -
TABLE 3: We compare detection rate of attractors with LID, FS, MagNet and Trapdoor. Description in Section 6.6.2.
Similarly, although SPSA uses non-gradient based optimization,
taking random small steps indirectly uses information on the soft
label’s gradient, and would still converge to the nearby attractor.
OB3: Attractors of Multi-Scale Gradients
The attacks MI-FGSM, JSMA and UAP indirectly carry out
some forms of gradient averaging in deciding the perturbation:
MI-FGSM uses the gradient of previous iterations to avoid falling
into the local minimum, JSMA saturates only a few pixels based
on the saliency map, and UAP searches for a universal perturbation
through averaging, that can be applied to most of the samples. In a
certain sense, such attacks are making decision based on gradient
at a lower scale in the multi-scale gradient representation.
Hence, to address such attacks, we should have a mixture of
attractors catering for attack-loss functions at different scales. Our
implementation achieves this by controlling the interval size δi and
the weightage αi for each pixel, where a larger δi corresponds to
lower scale, and a larger weights corresponds to larger emphasis
on the corresponding scale. In our experiment, we use two interval
sizes, 3 and 128, and give more weightage on larger interval size.
Empirically, this choice achieves good performance. It would be
interesting to find an analytical approach to determine the scale.
6.6.2 Comparison with Known Defenses
We compared the performance of our approach with three existing
detection analyzers: LID, FS. MagNet as well as Trapdoor in the
same setting. The results are shown in Table 3. Here we use true
positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), area under the curve
(AUC) and overall attack success rate to evaluate and compare.
• True Positive Rate (TPR) is the detection rate on successful
adversarial input that get misclassified. TPR is shown in Column
(a).
• False Positive Rate (FPR) is the percentage of clean samples
which get wrongly detected as adversarial for all the samples in
the test dataset. FPR is shown in Column (b).
• Area Under the Curve (AUC) computes the area under a ROC
curve. It is a threshold-independent benchmark for the detection
performance. AUC is shown in Column (c).
• Overall Attack Success Rate is defined in the previous Subsec-
tion 6.6.1 and shown in Column (d).
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We adopt and follow the definitions of TPR, FPR and AUC
in DEEPSEC [46]. The performance of known mechanisms in
Table 3 are obtained7 from results reported in DEEPSEC [46] and
Trapdoor [22].
For PGD, CW2 and EAD, experiments are carried out in two
different settings where one setting is same as DEEPSEC, and the
other from Shan et al. [22].
6.6.3 Performance at Low False Positive Rate
Our experiments follow settings in DEEPSEC where the false
positive rates (FPR) of LID, FS, MagNet as well as Trapdoor are set
to be around 5%. However, there are application scenarios where a
5% FPR would generate too many false alarms and not acceptable.
We conduct another experiment on our proposed method where
the FPR is adjusted to 0.5%, and the results are shown in Table 4.
Note that the proposed method still achieves good performance.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10
FPR 5% FPR 0.5% FPR 5% FPR 0.5% FPR
UA
/TA Attacks TPR
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
TPR
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
TPR
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
TPR
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
UA
FGSM 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
RFGSM 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
BIM 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9% 0.1% 99.9% 0.1%
PGD 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9% 0.1%
UMIFGSM 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 91.7% 8.3% 86.3% 13.7%
UAP 66.7% 0.1% 66.7% 0.1% 94.4% 4.9% 93.6% 5.6%
DeepFool 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 98.1% 1.9% 98.0% 2.0%
OM 87.8% 11.8% 85.7% 13.8% 81.9% 18.1% 81.1% 18.9%
BPDA 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9% 0.1%
SPSA 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
TA
LLC No
Adv
Found
0.0% No
Adv
Found
0.0% 98.1% 0.1% 98.1% 0.1%
RLLC 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 98.1% 0.3%
ILLC 0.0% 0.0% 97.0% 2.8% 90.7% 8.7%
TMIFGSM 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 89.6% 10.4% 81.1% 18.9%
JSMA 89.2% 0.6% 88.0% 0.6% 92.9% 7.1% 90.1% 9.9%
BLB 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.8% 0.2% 99.6% 0.4%
CW2 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.7% 0.3% 99.7% 0.3%
EAD 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 97.2% 2.2% 97.2% 2.2%
TABLE 4: Detection performance at 0.5% FPR.
6.7 Evaluation in Attack Setting 2
In this experiment, we use the same victimM(ψ,φ) and assume
that the adversary has access to the recovered class label produced
by the analyzers. To be specific, we evaluate the performance of
our model using Setting 2 as we described in Section 3.2. In this
setting, the attacks are pit against output of the recovery analyzer
to cause wrong predictions and evade the analysis at same time.
We also tested adversarial training in the same setting for
comparison. The results are shown in Table 5. For unbounded
attacks such as BLB, CW2 and EAD, we set maximum number of
iterations according to Table 9 and measure the L2 distortion of the
successful adversary samples in Table 6. Note that the successful
samples generated on our model has larger L2 distortion than on
the original classifier.
7. The data on TPR, FPR and AUC are directly quoted. The data on overall
attack success rate are derived from the reported performance. Since data on
the initial attack success rate for Trapdoor are not available, we are unable to
derive some of the overall attack success rate for Trapdoor.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10
UA
/TA Attacks
Original
Classifier
Cψ
Adversarial
Training
With
Attractor
M(ψ,φ)
Original
Classifier
Cψ
Adversarial
Training
With
Attractor
M(ψ,φ)
UA
FGSM 80.8% 35.0% 0.5% 88.7% 22.2% 4.9%
RFGSM 74.2% 23.5% 0.0% 99.6% 81.9% 5.3%
BIM 100% 90.0% 0.6% 100.0% 100.0% 5.0%
PGD 100% 90.3% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 6.3%
UMIFGSM 100% 92.6% 0.7% 100.0% 100.0% 8.6%
UAP 39.5% 1.5% 14.1% 93.1% 73.8% 28.1%
DeepFool 100.0% 90.9% 2.5% 100.0% 100.0% 3.3%
OM 100.0% 98.3% 18.1% 100.0% 100.0% 22.7%
BPDA 100.0% 86.9% 0.0% 100.0% 98.2% 7.5%
SPSA 95.4% 89.0% 0.4% 90.2% 87.5% 9.8%
TA
LLC 7.5% 0.6% 0.0% 13.2% 0.6% 2.1%
RLLC 2.1% 0.6% 0.0% 27.6% 5.8% 3.6%
ILLC 67.1% 19.2% 0.2% 100.0% 99.6% 8.0%
TMIFGSM 84.9% 21.9% 1.0% 100.0% 100.0% 27.6%
JSMA 71.0% 25.5% 2.5% 100.0% 63.9% 16.1%
BLB 100.0% 31.1% 0.7% 100.0% 100.0% 9.2%
CW2 100.0% 48.0% 2.8% 100.0% 100.0% 10.4%
EAD 100.0% 11.9% 3.0% 100.0% 100.0% 8.7%
TABLE 5: Attack success rate onM(ψ,φ) in Setting 2.
BLB CW2 EAD
Original Classifier Cψ 0.15 0.17 0.21
With Attractor M(ψ,φ) 0.41 0.38 0.45
TABLE 6: Average L2 distortion for unbounded attacks on CIFAR-
10 dataset in Setting 2.
As our model M(ψ,φ) is obtained by stitching various com-
ponents together, when in white-box, an adversary can study the
architecture and extract the components to create custom attacks.
To prevent such attacks, obfuscation is required.
6.8 Obfuscated Model
We take spread spectrum watermark decoder and use method
we introduced in Section 5.5 to obfuscate the architecture of a
victim model. Here we denote the obfuscated model as M˜. The
experiments is conducted using Setting 1.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10
UA
/TA Attacks
Initial
Attack
Success
Rate
Detection on
Misclassified
Input
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
Initial
Attack
Success
Rate
Detection on
Misclassified
Input
Overall
Attack
Success
Rate
UA
FGSM 93.7% 96.9% 2.9% 88.8% 94.6% 4.8%
RFGSM 79.3% 96.6% 2.7% 99.3% 95.0% 5.0%
BIM 100.0% 75.5% 24.5% 100.0% 98.1% 1.9%
PGD 100.0% 75.6% 24.4% 100.0% 97.7% 2.3%
UMIFGSM 100.0% 79.1% 20.9% 100.0% 97.5% 2.5%
UAP 39.9% 99.5% 0.2% 89.7% 99.9% 0.1%
DeepFool8 100.0% 65.3% 34.7% 91.8% 58.1% 38.5%
OM 100.0% 78.2% 21.8% 100.0% 70.1% 29.9%
BPDA 100.0% 74.2% 25.8% 100.0% 96.8% 3.2%
SPSA 83.9% 99.4% 0.5% 89.6% 100.0% 0.0%
TA
LLC 11.6% 100.0% 0.0% 10.8% 88.0% 1.3%
RLLC 3.6% 100.0% 0.0% 36.7% 71.7% 10.4%
ILLC 100.0% 74.6% 25.4% 100.0% 82.5% 17.5%
TMIFGSM 100.0% 95.4% 4.6% 100.0% 79.1% 20.9%
JSMA 42.1% 99.0% 1.0% 96.8% 91.5% 8.2%
BLB 100.0% 90.3% 9.7% 100.0% 84.3% 15.7%
CW2 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 99.0% 1.0%
EAD 100.0% 99.9% 0.1% 100.0% 98.3% 1.7%
TABLE 7: Attack success rate on obfuscated model M˜.
In Table 7, we can see that with obfuscation, the overall attack
success rate for most attacks can still be lowered significantly while
8. Attack success rate of DeepFool can be reduced to 0% by setting a
threshold on the difference between soft labels. However, we do not include it
here as this characteristic is not induced by attractors but by attack itself.
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having minimal impact on the overall classification accuracy. The
accuracy on clean data is also not much affected by obfuscation.
We have achieved 98.3% and 89.1% on clean samples of MNIST
and CIFAR-10 respectively.
We suspect there could potentially be methods to bypass our
obfuscation. However, currently we are not aware of any effective
attack that is able to unstitch this obfuscated model.
6.9 Transfer Attack and Transferability
It is shown that adversarial samples found using the substitute
model could be adversarial samples to the original victim model,
that is, adversarial samples are transferable [39].
We consider the strongest version of transfer attacks where the
substitute models have exactly same architectures as the victim
models. In addition, the adversary also has huge amount of labeled
data. Intuitively, such kind of attacks is hard to be defended
using our approach, but we can enhance our analyzer using other
defensive mechanisms.
There are many ways to combine our method with other
defenses. We give an example to combine the obfuscated model
M˜ and an adversarially trained classifier CAT .
We place the adversarially trained classifier inside the analyzer.
For a given input x, we get the prediction arg maxM˜(x). We
also get the prediction from the adversarially trained classi-
fier arg max CAT (x). If they give different predictions, that is
arg maxM˜(x) 6= arg max CAT (x), we declare the input as
adversarial. Otherwise, we declare the input as normal.
To see that why such combination works, note that due to the
special mechanisms in adversarial training and our obfuscation
method. M˜ and CAT have very different parameters. Therefore,
an adversarial sample that is successful on one of them may not
work on the other. Furthermore, for un-targeted attacks, even when
a sample is successfully misclassified on both models, it is unlikely
to be classified to the same wrong class by both models. Therefore,
this combined model poses more constraints and makes searching
for adversarial samples more difficult. On the other hand, as both
M˜ and CAT attain high accuracy on clean data, on a clean input,
they are likely to give the same prediction class. Therefore, this
method will not cause high false positive rate.
In this experiment, we tested the transferability of attacks on
(1) victim model without any defense, (2) obfuscated model M˜,
and (3) obfuscated model combined with an adversarially trained
classifier in the analyzer M˜COMB .
We used USPS [47] and CINIC-10 [48] as the training datasets
for the substitute models. They have same classes and similar
distribution as MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively.
The performance of transfer attacks are shown in Table 8.
The performance on non-transfer attacks and clean samples
remains same as Section 6.8. Attractors and obfuscation makes the
attacks slightly less transferable than on an undefended model.
Placing an adversarially trained model inside the analyzer to
verify the prediction greatly reduces the success rate of transfer
attacks. Indeed, attractors can be used with most existing defense
mechanisms to enhance the robustness.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10
UA
/TA Attacks
Without
Defense
Cψ
With
Attractor
+Obfus
M˜
Combined
Model
M˜COMB
Without
Defense
Cψ
With
Attractor
+Obfus
M˜
Combined
Model
M˜COMB
UA
FGSM 74.7% 74.0% 14.3% 76.1% 73.3% 12.6%
RFGSM 57.0% 55.7% 9.6% 67.5% 64.4% 13.3%
BIM 67.0% 65.5% 15.1% 55.8% 54.1% 19.2%
PGD 65.4% 63.6% 13.0% 62.9% 59.0% 13.2%
UMIFGSM 78.6% 76.2% 18.0% 75.7% 73.9% 20.1%
UAP 30.6% 31.9% 3.5% 35.2% 34.6% 9.7%
DeepFool 37.6% 46.6% 8.0% 25.1% 25.3% 10.3%
OM 40.4% 49.2% 7.4% 26.3% 26.5% 10.0%
BPDA 61.2% 58.1% 12.2% 60.8% 57.1% 14.2%
SPSA 43.7% 44.5% 9.1% 54.6% 54.0% 11.4%
TA
LLC 15.0% 8.7% 2.7% 12.3% 9.5% 1.2%
RLLC 11.1% 9.2% 1.4% 9.1% 7.2% 0.8%
ILLC 26.4% 21.2% 7.7% 3.7% 3.2% 0.0%
TMIFGSM 22.9% 19.6% 10.7% 14.3% 14.8% 2.4%
JSMA 8.6% 8.9% 1.6% 4.1% 3.8% 1.3%
BLB 16.7% 15.5% 9.0% 3.0% 3.3% 1.0%
CW2 4.7% 6.0% 1.3% 3.0% 3.2% 0.9%
EAD 0.5% 0.7% 0.5% 2.9% 2.9% 0.9%
TABLE 8: Transfer attack success rate on M˜COMB .
7 ATTRACTORS VS TRAPDOORS
Unlike an attractor, a trapdoor ∆t for the t-th class is a perturbation
that leads almost all samples to the t-th class. Hence, when such
perturbation ∆t is applied to a clean sample x that is not in the t-th
class, the perturbed sample (x+ ∆t) is likely to be misclassified
as t.
Attractors and trapdoors are related and it is possible that a
model possesses properties of both. However, there are a number
of key differences and crucial implications between the two notions.
Implicit vs Explicit Constraints on Gradients. The notion of
trapdoor does not explicitly impose constraints on the attack
objective function. It is interesting to investigate whether the
existence of a trapdoor is sufficient in misleading the attack, so
that the attack searches along the trapdoor. If this is not the case,
attacks would still be successful in the presences of trapdoors. In
contrast, the notion of attractor explicitly forces the gradient to
point toward the attractors. Consequently, an attack that moves
along the gradient would move toward the attractors as intended.
Implications in Construction. Classification model with
trapdoors could be obtained through training on a mixture of the
original training dataset and perturbed data. More specifically,
suppose 〈D1, . . . , Dn〉 is the training dataset of the original
victim classifier, where Di contains samples in the i-th class,
the mixed training set is 〈D1 ∪ D˜1, . . . , Dn ∪ D˜n〉 where D˜i
contains samples perturbed with the trapdoor Ti, that is,
D˜i = {x˜ | x˜ = ∆i + x, where x ∈ Dj for some j 6= i}
Shen et al. observed that the trained model exhibits properties of
the trapdoors and attains high accuracy on the original classification
task.
Here, we argue that in an optimally trained model, the direction
of the soft label’s gradient might not align with the trapdoors.
Hence, even if there are trapdoors, we are unable to detect
adversarial samples obtained from attacks. To illustrate this concern,
we give a neural network model Mθ˜ that attains the training
objective and yet cannot detect gradient-based adversarial attacks.
Essentially,Mθ˜ first checks whether an input x contains trapdoor.
If so, it returns the class associated with the trapdoor. Otherwise, it
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returns the original classification result. Therefore, the output of
Mθ˜ becomes:
Mθ˜(x) = Dκ(x) · Wω(x) + (1−Dκ(x)) · Cpi(x)
where Dκ checks whether there is trapdoor.Wω and Cpi classify
trapdoors and original dataset respectively.
During an attack, the adversary first feeds in an clean sample
x. The output of Dκ(x) is small since it does not contain trapdoor.
The gradient produced byMθ˜ becomes close to the gradient by Cpi .
Therefore, an adversarial attack carried on this “optimal” model
may not get trapdoored.
We show more details of this construction and its analysis in
Appendix C and D.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented another angle of viewing adversarial defense
mechanisms. Instead of focusing on the adversarial samples
themselves, we disrupt the attacking process by injecting attractors.
We propose a modular approach which provides design flexibility
and explainability of the outcomes. Empirical results show that our
approach can be very effective.
We highlighted that modular design, although provides flex-
ibility and explainability, unfortunately also opens up the threat
that a white-box attacker might be able to exploit outputs of
individual modules in finding adversarial examples. One approach
to defend against such attacks is by obfuscating the layout and
parameters. We also gave an obfuscation method to demonstrate
this approach. However, our obfuscation method could not be
easily applied on complex layout (e.g. QIM decoder), and more
thorough security analysis is required to investigate its obfuscating
capability. It is interesting to further investigate other obfuscation
methods. In a certain way, our experimentation results show that,
with secure obfuscation, it is possible to attain high robustness
against adversarial attacks. This leads to an interesting question on
whether the fundamental difficulty in defending adversarial attack
lies in obfuscation, or in some intriguing properties of decision
boundary.
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APPENDIX A
ATTACKS USED IN EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we briefly describe attacks in our experiments.
We denote the victim classification model as Mθ : X → Rn
parameterized by θ. Given an input x ∈ X ,Mθ outputs a vector
yˆ = [yˆ1 yˆ2 . . . yˆn]
T where each yˆi represents the soft label for
class i, and is the probability that input x belongs to the class
i. The classification of x is the most likely predicted class, i.e.,
arg maxMθ(x). We write J(·, ·, ·) as the classification loss
function.
Box-constrained L-BFGS Attack (BLB) [5]. Szegedy et
al. formulated generation of adversarial samples as an optimization
problem. Given an input image x and a target ytarget, the goal is
to minimize min ‖x−x′‖2 such thatMθ(x) = ytarget. Szegedy
et al. transformed this goal into an easier problem: minimizing
c · ‖x− x′‖2 + J(θ,x′,ytarget).
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6]. FGSM moves
a fixed small step  in the direction that maximally changes the
prediction result. The adversarial sample for an un-targeted attack
is:
x′ = x+  · sign (∇xJ (θ,x,ytrue))
where ytrue is the one-hot vector of the true label of the input x.
The adversarial sample for an targeted attack is:
x′ = x−  · sign (∇xJ (θ,x,ytarget))
where ytarget is the one-hot vector of the target label.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [25]. BIM is an extension of
FGSM which extends the one-step attack into an iterative process.
The attack chooses the starting point x′0 = x and the subsequent
steps:
x′n+1 = clip(x
′
n +  · sign (∇xJ (θ,x′n,ytrue)))
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [26]. PGD is an
improvement over BIM. The search process starts at a random
point within the norm ball, and then follows the iterations similar
to BIM.
Momentum Iterative FGSM (MI-FGSM) [27]. Dong et
al. proposed using gradients from previous iterations and applying
momentum to prevent overfitting.
DeepFool [1]. DeepFool finds the minimal perturbation 
to change the predication result:
∆(x;Mθ) = min

‖‖2 subject toMθ(x+ ) 6=Mθ(x)
DeepFool views neural network classifiers as hyperplanes
separating different classes. In a binary classifier, the minimal
perturbation is the distance from x0 to the separating hyperplane
M =
{
x : wTx+ b = 0
}
. The minimal perturbation is the
orthogonal projection of x0 ontoM .
Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAP) [30]. Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. proposed UAP which is a quasi-imperceptible
image agnostic perturbation that can cause misclassification for
most images sampled from the data distribution.
OptMargin (OM) [49]. He et al. proposed OptMargin
which generates low-distortion adversarial samples that are robust
to small perturbations. This approach circumvents defenses such as
transformation based defenses that sample in a small neighborhood
around an input instance and get the majority prediction.
Carlini and Wagner (C&W) [28]. C&W is an iterative
optimization method. Its goal is to minimize the loss ||+c·f(x+)
where f is an objective function such thatMθ(x+ ) = ytarget
if and only if f(x+ ) ≤ 0 and c is a constant.
Elastic-Net Attacks (EAD) [29]. EAD uses the same
loss function as C&W but combines both L1 and L2 penalty
functions to minimize the difference between adversarial samples
and original image.
Least Likely Class attack (LLC) [25]. LLC is similar
to FGSM. Instead of decreasing the score of the correct class, LLC
attempts to increase the score of a least likely class. That is:
x′ = x−  · sign (∇xJ (θ,x,yLL))
I-LLC is the iterative version of LLC.
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [31]. JSMA
selects a few pixels in a clean sample based on the saliency map
and saturates them either to the minimum or maximum value such
that the new sample can be misclassified.
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) [37].
Athalye et al. suggested that most defenses either intentionally
or unintentionally break or hide the gradients as a way to
prevent adversarial attack. BPDA approximates the gradient for a
non-differentiable layer so that backpropagation-based attacks can
be effective against such defenses.
Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation
(SPSA) [38]. SPSA uses non-gradient based optimization. By
taking random small steps around the input, SPSA attempts to find
the global minima.
RFGSM, RLLC [50]. Tramer et al. proposed adding
random perturbations drawn from Gaussian distribution before
calculating the gradient. This targets at defenses that use gradient
masking.
APPENDIX B
EXISTING DEFENSES USED IN EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe the three defense we compared in our
experiments.
Local Intrinsic Dimensionality Based Detector (LID) [2].
Intrinsic dimensionality of manifold can be seen as the minimum
dimensionality required to represent a data sample on the manifold.
Since data samples from a dataset can be on different manifolds,
local intrinsic dimensionality (LID) is used to measure the intrinsic
dimensionality of a single data sample. Ma et al. observed
adversarial perturbation can change the LID characteristics of
an adversarial region. Their experiments showed adversarial
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samples have significantly higher estimated LID than normal
samples. Based on this observation, they built a LID-based detector.
Feature Squeezing Detector (FS) [3]. Xu et al. suggested
the unnecessarily large feature input space often gives room for
adversarial samples. They proposed feature squeezing to limit the
degree of freedom for adversary. The feature squeezing methods
include reduction of color depth and smoothing. The framework
evaluates the prediction results of both the original input and input
pre-processed by feature squeezing. The input will be identified as
adversarial if the difference between any two results is larger than
a certain threshold.
MagNet Detector [4]. Meng and Chen suggested that
one of the reasons that adversarial sample can cause wrong
classification is that adversarial samples are far from the normal
data manifold. They built a detector that measures how different an
input sample is from normal samples. Two detection mechanisms
were discussed in Meng and Chen’s paper: detection based on the
reconstruction error of a trained autoencoder on the given dataset,
detection based on probability divergence.
APPENDIX C
CONSTRUCTION OF TRAPDOOR
In an optimally trained model, the direction of the soft label’s
gradient might not align with the trapdoors. Hence, even if there
are trapdoors, we are unable to detect adversarial samples obtained
from gradient-based attacks. To illustrate this concern, we give a
neural network modelMθ˜ that attains the training objective stated
in trapdoor paper and yet cannot detect gradient-based adversarial
attacks. Our construction first obtains three neural network models
Cpi , Dκ and Wω parametrized by pi, κ and ω respectively, and
combined them to obtainMθ˜ .
1) Cpi : X → Rn is the model for the original classification task.
It is obtained by training on 〈D1, . . . , Dn〉. We assume that the
accuracy of Cpi is high and it is difficult to further enhance its
accuracy.
2) Wω : X → Rn is the trapdoor decoder, which predicts the
class of trapdoor in the input. It can be trained on 〈D˜1, . . . , D˜n〉.
While it is possible to achieve high accuracy through training,
the predication process is essentially a watermark decoding
process and well understood. Hence we can analytically design
an accurate neural network classifier as the trapdoor decoder.
3) Dκ : X → R is the trapdoor detector, which detects whether
the input contains a trapdoor. Let us write Dκ(x) = dˆ where
dˆ is the probability that the input contains a trapdoor. The
detector can be trained on the two-class dataset 〈D1 ∪ . . . ∪
Dn, D˜1∪. . .∪D˜n〉. Similar toWω , since the detection process
is well-understood, we can analytically derive an accurate neural
network classifier.
Figure 6 illustrates how these three models are combined. On
input x, the output of the combined model is the weighted sum:
Mθ˜(x) = Dκ(x) · Wω(x) + (1−Dκ(x)) · Cpi(x) (2)
Note that the combinedMθ˜ attains high accuracy and meets
the training goals: on a clean input x belongs to the class t,Mθ˜
behaves similar to Cpi; on input perturbed with trapdoor, Mθ˜
behaves similar toWω .
Fig. 6: Trapdoored model meeting the training goals, but vulnerable
to adversarial attacks.
Now, consider a clean input x of class t, we sample in its
small neighborhood and feed into Dκ. Since Dκ is accurate, the
output value Dκ(x) would be small. Hence, the gradients produced
by Mθ˜ would be close to the gradients by Cpi . Subsequently,
a gradient-based attack (e.g. FGSM) on Mθ˜ would obtain an
adversarial sample x′ that is similar to the result when applied on
the original victim Cpi , and thus the adversarial sample cannot be
detected.
APPENDIX D
ANALYSIS OF TRAPDOOR
We conducted similar experiment on a trapdoored model for
comparison. Here, we use the construction discussed in Appendix C.
In this experiment, the watermark decoder Wω is implemented
based on additive watermark. Similarly, we feed 10,000 testing
images from MNIST dataset and compute the values and gradients
of N1 and N2 for each testing image. Figure 7(a) reports the KDE
derived from the measurements.
Recall that outputs of the constructed model is the sum of
two weighted terms given in equation (2) which corresponds to
the signal at (1) and (2) in Figure 6. For convenience, let us call
the two terms N1 and N2, that is, N1 = Dκ(x) · Wω(x) and
N2 = (1−Dκ(x)) · Cpi(x) on input x.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Comparing magnitude (1-norm) of outputs and gradients
from Cpi and Wω . (a) KDE plot of ‖N1‖1 and ‖N2‖1 where
N1 = Dκ(x) ·Wω(x) and N2 = (1−Dκ(x)) · Cpi(x). (b) KDE
plot of ‖M1‖1 and ‖M2‖1 where M1 = ∇xJ((ω, κ),x,ytrue)
and M2 = ∇xJ((pi, κ),x,ytrue).
Figure 7(a) shows that, on clean samples, N2 dominates N1,
and thus the accuracy of the combined trapdoored model would
have the same accuracy as the victim model Cpi .
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The gradient is more complicated to determine since the term
N1 involves multiplication of two functions on x. We directly
measure the two gradients using the corresponding signals (1) and
(2) in Figure 6. Let us denote (pi, κ) the parameters of a neural
network that outputs the signal (1), and (ω, κ) the parameters of a
neural network that outputs the signal (2) in Figure 6.
Figure 7(b) shows the KDE plot of ‖∇xJ((ω, κ),x,ytrue)‖1
and ‖∇xJ((pi, κ),x,ytrue)‖1. The gradient on clean input is
dominated by gradient of N2, which is the gradient from the victim
model. Hence, an attack conducted on the trapdoored model would
not involve contribution from the trapdoors, and thus cannot be
detected by the analyzer.
APPENDIX E
EXPERIMENT SETUP
Attacks ConfigurationsUA/TA Objective Attacks
M
N
IS
T
UAs
L∞,  = 0.3
FGSM  = 0.3
RFGSM  = 0.15 α = 0.15
BIM  = 0.3 iteration=15;ieps iter=0.05
PGD  = 0.3 iteration=15;ieps iter=0.05
UMIFGSM  = 0.3 iteration=15;ieps iter=0.05
UAP  = 0.3 fool rate=30%
L2
DF overshoot=0.02 max iter=50
OM
batch size=1000;
initial const=0.02;
bin search steps=4
learning rate=0.2;
noise count=20;
noise mag=0.3
TAs
L∞,  = 0.3
LLC  = 0.3
RLLC  = 0.15 α = 0.15
ILLC  = 0.3 eps iter=0.05
TMIFGSM  = 0.3 eps iter=0.05
L0 JSMA θ = 1 γ = 0.1
L2
BLB binary step=5 maximum iteration=1000;init const=0.01
CW2 batch size=10;learning rate=0.02
maximum iteration=10000;
init const=0.001 ;
box=-0.5, 0.5
EAD binary step=10;learning rate=0.02
maximum iteration=10000;
β = 1e− 3
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
UAs
L∞,  = 0.1
FGSM  = 0.1
RFGSM  = 0.05 α = 0.05
BIM  = 0.1 iteration=15;ieps iter=0.01
PGD  = 0.1 iteration=15;ieps iter=0.01
UMIFGSM  = 0.1 iteration=15;ieps iter=0.01
UAP  = 0.1 fool rate=30%
L2
DF overshoot=0.02 max iter=50
OM
batch size=1;
initial const=1;
bin search steps=4
learning rate=0.02;
noise count=20;
noise mag=0.3
TAs
L∞,  = 0.1
LLC  = 0.1
RLLC  = 0.05 α = 0.05
ILLC  = 0.1 eps iter=0.01
TMIFGSM  = 0.1 eps iter=0.01
L0 JSMA θ = 1 γ = 0.1
L2
BLB binary step=5 maximum iteration=1000;init const=0.01
CW2 binary step=10;learning rate=0.02
maximum iteration=10000;
init const=0.001;
box=-0.5, 0.5
EAD binary step=10;learning rate=0.02
maximum iteration=10000;
β = 1e− 3
TABLE 9: Settings of adversarial attacks used in comparison with
LID, FS and MagNet. Table is from DEEPSEC [46].
UA/TA Attacks Attack Configuration
UAs
FGSM  = 0.3
PGD  = 0.3 iteration=100;eps iter=0.04
BPDA  = 0.3 iteration=100;eps iter=0.04
SPSA  = 0.3;learning rate=0.1 iteration=500
TAs CW2
binary step=20;
learning rate=0.1
maximum iteration=500;
init const=0.001
EAD binary step=20;learning rate=0.5
maximum iteration=500;
init const=0.001
TABLE 10: Settings of adversarial attacks used in comparison with
Trapdoor. Table is from Trapdoor paper [22].
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